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Novel artificial genetic systems with twelve bases instead of four.1  Bacteria that can be 
programmed to take photographs2 or form visible patterns.3 Cells that can count the number of 
times they divide.4  A live polio virus “created from scratch using mail-order segments of DNA 
and a viral genome map that is freely available on the Internet.”5  These are some of the 
remarkable, and occasionally disturbing, fruits of “synthetic biology,” the attempt to construct 
life starting at the genetic level.  In terms of their scale and ambition, these efforts go beyond 
traditional recombinant DNA technology.  Rather than simply transferring a pre-existing gene 
from one species to another, synthetic biologists aim to make biology a true engineering 
discipline.  In the same way that electrical engineers rely on standard capacitors and resistors, or 
computer programmers rely on modular blocks of code, synthetic biologists wish to create an 
array of modular biological parts that can be readily synthesized and mixed together in different 
combinations. MIT has a “Registry of Standard Biological Parts [which] supports this goal by 
recording and indexing biological parts that are currently being built and offering synthesis and 
assembly services to construct new parts, devices, and systems.”6  Systems, devices, parts, and 
DNA represent descending levels of complexity – systems consist of devices, and devices consist 
of parts composed of DNA.  The idea behind a registry of parts is that these parts can, and 
should, be recombined in different ways to produce many different types of devices and systems. 
Although the Registry currently contains physical DNA, its developers believe that, as DNA 
synthesis technology becomes increasingly inexpensive,7 the Registry will be composed largely 
of information and specifications which can be executed in synthesizers just as semiconductor 
chip designs are executed by fabrication firms. 
 Synthetic biology has already produced important results, including more accurate AIDS 
tests and the possibility of unlimited supplies of previously scarce drugs for malaria.8 Proponents 
hope to use synthetic organisms to produce not only medically relevant chemicals but also a 
large variety of industrial materials, including biofuels such as hydrogen and ethanol.9 At the 
same time, synthetic biology has engendered numerous policy concerns. From its inception, 
commentators have raised issues ranging from bioethical and environmental worries to fears of 
bioterrorism – indeed, the Central Intelligence Agency released a report in 2003 called “The 
Darker Bio-Weapons Future” that explicitly referred to the dangers posed by the possibility of 
genetically engineered “super-viruses”10  
 There is, however, one area that has been largely unexplored until this point – the 
relationship of synthetic biology to intellectual property law.  Two key issues deserve further 
attention.  First, synthetic biology, which operates at the confluence of biotechnology and 
computation, presents a particularly revealing example of a difficulty that the law has frequently 
faced over the last 30 years – the assimilation of a new technology into the conceptual limits 
around existing intellectual property rights, with possible damage to both in the process.  There 
is reason to fear that tendencies in the way that the law has handled software on the one hand and 
biotechnology on the other could come together in a “perfect storm” that will impede the 
potential of the technology. Second, synthetic biology raises with remarkable clarity an issue that  
has seemed of only theoretical interest until now.  It points out a tension between different 
methods of creating “openness”.  On the one hand, we have intellectual property law’s insistence 
that certain types of material remain in the public domain, outside the world of property.  On the 
other, we have the attempt by individuals to use intellectual property rights to create a 
“commons,” just as developers of free and open source software use the leverage of software 
copyrights to impose requirements of openness on future programmers, requirements greater 
than those attaching to a public domain work. Intellectual property policy, at least in the United 
States, specifies things that cannot be covered by intellectual property rights, such as abstract 
ideas or compilations of unoriginal facts, precisely to leave them “open” to all – the public roads 
of the intellect.11  Yet many of the techniques of open source require property rights so that 
future users and third parties will be bound by the terms of the license.  Should we rethink the 
boundary lines between intellectual property and the public domain as a result?   
 
THE PERFECT STORM: FLAWED BIOTECH LAW MEETS FLAWED SOFTWARE LAW?   
 
           Intellectual property law has already had difficulty incorporating the revolutionary 
technologies from which synthetic biology draws inspiration – biotechnology and computers.   In 
the area of biotechnology, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (which hears most 
patent appeals) has tended not to enforce the patent law requirement that inventions be 
“nonobvious” to the ordinary scientist working in the area.  Years after methods for cloning 
genes became routine and widely known, the Federal Circuit continues to treat the gene products 
of such methods as patentable.12  On the Federal Circuit’s reasoning, what matters is not whether 
a practicing biologist would find a particular invention obvious but, rather, per se rules about 
nonobviousness developed for chemical inventions in the mid-20th century.13  So one major part 
of the technological terrain into which synthetic biology must fit – biotechnology – has already 
proven difficult for intellectual property law to manage.   
 While biotechnology has mainly posed difficulties for patent law, computers have posed 
both copyright and patent problems.  Copyright covers original works of expression. It explicitly 
excludes works that are functional.  Patent law covers inventions that are useful, novel and non-
obvious – functionality is a requirement, not an impediment.  However, it had traditionally been 
understood to exclude formulas and algorithms.   Thus software – a machine made of words, a 
set of algorithmic instructions devoted to a particular function – seemed to fit neither the 
copyright nor the patent box.  It was too functional for copyright, too close to a collection of 
algorithms and ideas for patent.  What’s more, certain economic aspects of software, including 
its high propensity to display “network effects” (increased utility from product use based on 
increase in number of others using the product) led scholars believe that both copyright and 
patent were ill-suited to encourage innovation without discouraging competition.  Several sui 
generis, or custom-made, intellectual property regimes were proposed as an alternative.   
In the event, as a result of statements by Congress and actions by the courts, software 
ended up being covered by both copyright and patent – a result that most scholars thought was 
far from ideal.  Moreover, the refusal by at least some members of the Federal Circuit to allow 
patent examiners to use unwritten information to determine whether a particular patent 
application is obvious14 may have a disproportionate impact on computer-related inventions.  
Because much knowledge in the field of computer technology is not written down in journal 
articles, it may be hard for a patent examiner to find specific written references testifying to 
information that is generally known.  Additionally, many scholars have argued that the Federal 
Circuit allows unduly broad patents to issue in the area of software. 15 
How does this history of intellectual property law’s struggles to deal with software and 
biotechnology bear on synthetic biology?  Consider the following patent, issued by the PTO on 
August 10, 2004.  The patent, number 6,774,222, issued to the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (“HHS”), is entitled “Molecular Computing Elements, Gates, and Flip-flops.”  
This patent covers using the combination of nucleic-acid binding proteins and nucleic acids to set 
up data storage as well as logic gates that perform basic Boolean algebra.  As the patent 
document notes, the invention could be used not only for computation but also for complex 
(“digital”) control of gene expression.  The broadest claim, claim 1, does not limit itself to any 
particular set of nuclei-acid binding proteins or nucleic acids.  Many types of molecular 
computing and control of gene expression are likely to be covered by such a patent.  Moreover, 
the claim uses language that would cover not only the “parts” that performed the Boolean 
algebra but also any device and system that contained these parts.  Such a patent would seem 
effectively to patent algebra, or the basic functions of computing, when implemented by the most 
likely genetic means. It is difficult even to imagine the consequences of an equivalent patent on 
the software industry.  What is the likelihood that this foundational patent, or one similar to it, 
would hold up in court?   
Given the low nonobviousness threshold that the Federal Circuit has set in the area of 
biotechnology, there is some possibility that the court would apply a similarly low threshold 
here.  But even if the HHS invention were viewed as more similar to software or electronics than 
to biotechnology, the nonobviousness threshold could still be low.  This is because, as noted 
earlier, the Federal Circuit is reluctant to allow unwritten knowledge to be used in determining 
nonobviousness.  So even if, at the time the HHS invention was made, individuals working in the 
field knew that many computing functions could readily be performed using DNA, this unwritten 
knowledge might not be factored into the nonobviousness determination.  Additionally, to the 
extent that the HHS patent were viewed as software, it would probably not be considered too 
broad.  Notably, the HHS patent is not unique in its breadth.  A Stanford University patent claims 
the use of computer system to simulate the operation of a biochemical network, at least for a 
specified period of time.16  
Considerable historical evidence, including evidence from virtually every important 
industry of the 20th century, suggests that broad patents on foundational research can slow 
growth in the industry.17  In this regard, it may be particularly instructive to contrast the 
proprietary situation in the nascent area of synthetic biology with that of computer hardware, 
computer software, and biotechnology in their infancy.  In the area of computer hardware, the 
specter of broad patents loomed large until government action forced licensing of the AT&T 
transistor patent as well as patents obtained by Texas Instruments and Fairchild Instruments on 
integrated circuits.  As for software, it was already a robust industry before software patents 
became available.  Biotechnology’s foundational technologies – monoclonal antibodies and 
recombinant techniques – either were not patented or were made available widely at reasonable 
cost.  Synthetic biology may be coming of age under different circumstances, at the juncture of 
two technologies with which the law was already struggling. 
In addition to the problem of broad foundational patents, there is the possibility of a 
plethora of narrower patents, some of which may fall within the scope of the foundational 
patents.  For example, scientists at Boston University have filed somewhat narrower patents that 
claim the use of DNA to produce specific gene regulation mechanisms such as a multi-state 
oscillator; a genetic toggle switch; and an adjustable threshold switch.18  MIT and Sangamo have 
patents on various types of DNA-binding proteins.  At least in the area of information 
technology,19 there is considerable evidence that patent thickets20 or “anti-commons”21 create 
difficulties for subsequent researchers above and beyond those created by foundational patents.  
This is because many products in information technology represent combinations of dozens if 
not hundreds of patented parts.  To the extent that work in synthetic biology is similarly likely to 
rely on combinations of many parts, the thicket or anti-commons difficulty may be quite salient.  
Not only does a crowded patent landscape create the possibility of “hold-up” by a previously 
unknown patent holder who emerges only after others have invested large sums of money in the 
area of the patented invention, but to the extent that patent rights holders rely upon reach-through 
royalties to secure revenue, standard economic theory predicts that product output by the 
improver will be suboptimal.22  Moreover, while firms that work in information technology have 
sometimes succeeded in pooling patents, particularly patents around industry standards, efforts at 
patent pooling do not always succeed in addressing problems of inefficient royalty-stacking.23  
Such efforts have also been stymied by failure on the part of participating firms to disclose 
relevant patents.24  In any event, because synthetic biology encompasses not only information 
technology but also biotechnology, the absence of any successful patent pools in the life sciences 
is cause for concern.     
 
A SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY COMMONS? 
 
These intellectual property concerns have not gone unnoticed.  The MIT scientists 
involved with the Registry of Standard Biological Parts are sufficiently concerned that they have 
created a “Bio-Bricks Foundation” that might serve to coordinate a synthetic biology 
“commons.”  The idea of a synthetic biology commons draws inspiration, in part, from the 
prominence of the open source software model as an alternative to proprietary software.  Like 
software, synthetic biology aims to be information-based and modular.  Indeed, the synthetic 
biologist might argue that what she does is comparable to software programming – the only 
difference is that synthetic biologists programs with four bases (As, Ts, Cs, and Gs) while 
ordinary software programmers use 0s and 1s.  So the analogy to open source software is hardly 
far-fetched.   
Unlike proprietary software developers, open source software producers make their 
source code freely available for improvement, modification, and redistribution.  Certain types of 
open source licenses also have a “commons-expanding” aspect: these “copyleft” licenses not 
only make source code freely available, but they also require those who distribute improvements 
to the source code to make the improvements available on the same terms.25  Copylefted 
software relies heavily on the existence of property rights – specifically, copyright in the source 
code.  Because of this copyright, users of the copylefted software necessarily use it subject to the 
terms of the license.     
Synthetic biologist might argue that strings of DNA bases are comparable to source code 
and that DNA strings could therefore also be covered by copyright.  The difficulty with this line 
of reasoning is that software itself fits poorly into copyright’s categories. Congress indicated a 
desire that software be covered by copyright, but left it to the courts to work out the method of 
doing so. As developed by the courts, copyright protection in software is thin – for example, 
source code is generally protected against verbatim copying.  Even with source code, moreover, 
if the code is entirely dictated by functional concerns or has become an industry standard, it may 
not be protected by copyright at all.     
Where does this leave synthetic biology?  There are two major obstacles.  First, unlike 
software, the products of synthetic biology are not discussed as copyrightable subject matter in 
the statute.  Thus a court that wished to find that material copyrightable would have to do so by 
analogy.  Second, even if courts were willing to make such an analogy, there are the internal 
restrictions of copyright law, which does not cover functional articles or methods of operation, 
and requires expressive choices.   Thus even for a court willing to take the first step and 
analogize synthetic biology to software, there would be further obstacles to overcome.  As a 
matter of legal doctrine, the answer might depend upon the type of synthetic biology involved.  
For example, the construction of DNA sequences using base pairs that do not exist in nature 
might allow significant room for expressive choice.  Such DNA sequences might be protected by 
copyright, at least against verbatim copying.  However, most synthetic biologists working today, 
including those at MIT, are working within the confines of the existing genetic code.  This code 
constrains the expressive choices that they make, making copyright protection less likely.  
Beyond formal legal doctrine lies a set of policy concerns.  With patent rights clearly available, 
courts and Congress might be reluctant to layer on an entirely new kind of property right, for fear 
that such rights would hurt rather than help innovation.  The fact the question of copyrightability 
arises in the attempt to create a research commons should not change the conclusion. While the 
goal is a laudable one, the boundaries of the public domain should not be altered to enable a 
particular initiative. 
Thus, in the case of synthetic biology, the ability to invoke copyright is by no means 
clear.  An obvious alternative is patents.  One example of a patent-based commons is that created 
by the group Biological Innovation for an Open Society (BIOS).  BIOS is using patent protection 
on a few key plant gene transfer technologies to force licensees to put improvements to those 
technologies into the commons.26  Although some have suggested that the BIOS approach could  
raise concerns about antitrust and patent misuse,27 the concern should be relatively small given 
BIOS’s mission to expand the commons and the relatively permissive, rule of reason-based 
approach taken by contemporary antitrust law.  The more pressing problem for purposes of 
projects like the MIT Registry – which contains more than two thousand standardized parts – is 
that a patent-based approach may be quite expensive.  A single patent can cost tens of thousands 
of dollars to secure.   
Of course, to the extent that a few broad patents might effectively cover many of the parts 
in the Registry, the patent option becomes more plausible.  For example, a patent comparable in 
breadth to the HHS patent noted above might cover many Registry parts.  In this scenario, the 
Registry would essentially be exploiting flaws in the current patent system for commons-
expanding purposes.  The difficulty in this scenario would be to identify an area of inventive 
territory that was quite broad but nonetheless not suggested either by prior broad patents or by 
information already in the public domain.        
Alternatively, the Registry might try to attract statements of non-assertion by other 
patentees, on the model of recent statements by IBM, Sun Microsystems, and other firms that 
they will not assert their patents against anyone working on open source software.  Indeed, the 
fact that many synthetic biology patents are currently held by academic and government 
institutions may make such statements of assertion a real possibility.  Non-assertion statements 
would certainly be useful in providing those who are working on the MIT Registry comfort in 
moving forward.  More generally, to the extent that institutions with synthetic biology patents 
vowed not to assert their patents against academic researchers, such a move would be a salutary 
development.  Non-assertion statements are not, however, a property right.  In order to secure a 
property right, the owners of the MIT Registry would need a license with explicit permission to 
sublicense.  Moreover, patents licensed to the Registry would have to cover, at least in some 
fashion, parts that were important for maintaining and expanding the commons.   
 Another alternative for securing an expanding commons might rely on some kind of 
contract, such as a “clickwrap” license over the Bio-Bricks. This contractual alternative does not 
require an underlying property right. Instead, the contract simply imposes conditions as part of 
the price of access.  One problem with such contracts is that they bind only those who receive the 
technology from the entity imposing the terms.  Attempts to prevent leakage to those not bound 
by the terms of the contract can require strict restrictions on information dissemination.  For 
example, for some time the publicly funded International HapMap project (a database of human 
genetic variation) used a click-wrap license.  This license required those who sought access to 
single nucleotide polymorphism (“SNP”) data to refrain from combining it with their own 
proprietary SNP data in order to seek product patents on haplotypes (collections of SNPs).  In 
order to prevent leakage of the data outside the confines of this clickwrap license, to those who 
would then have no obligation to the HapMap commons, the license required those who sought 
the data to refrain from disseminating to anyone who had not signed on to the license.  
Conventional publication of the data was not possible.  This condition is no longer imposed 
because it is believed that the database has reached a sufficient density to be self-sustaining and 
to defeat subsequent patent claims. But the old requirements indicate one of the difficulties of the 
‘clickwrap’ approach; the comparative weakness of the contractual restraints paradoxically 
requires extremely broad restrictions on dissemination.   
Finally, legislative proposals might create sui generis property rights mechanisms for 
protecting BioBricks data.  Indeed, the European Union currently has sui generis protection of 
data.  The evidence suggests, however, that strong property rights protection is likely to hinder 
rather than promote innovation.28  A recent draft of the proposed Access to Knowledge treaty 
offers an alternative sui generis approach: under this approach, member countries would adopt 
legislation protecting “qualifying open databases” from patents on certain types of improvements 
for a specified period of time.29  Various commentators affiliated with the Access to Knowledge 
proposal have also suggested the possibility of “social patents” legislation: under this approach, a 
type of patent right could be secured at low or no cost, but it could not be used for exclusionary 
commercial purposes.  Although these sui generis alternatives are quite intriguing, and certainly 
an improvement over ordinary property rights in databases, securing new legislation is a 
difficult, uncertain, and slow route.   
 We close with one overarching observation.  Copyleft licenses, which lead to the 
formation of an ever-expanding commons, have worked well – even brilliantly – in the software 
context.  Copyright licenses have produced well-functioning code, and they have also 
constrained the threat posed by copyright and patent, particularly when such intellectual 
property could be attached to an incipient industry standard.  Will they work as well in synthetic 
biology?  There is reason for some caution.  Intellectual property rights are relatively 
unimportant as incentives at any stage in the production of copyleft software.  They are 
important mainly for the leverage they give to the licensor.  But synthetic biology might be 
different.  Though the uses of synthetic biology are by no means limited to biomedicine, at the 
end of some biological chains of innovation will lie the expensive development and 
commercialization of a drug.  While taking a drug all the way through FDA-mandated clinical 
trials may not cost as much as drug companies claim, it does cost hundreds of millions of dollars.  
Whether patent rights are the best incentive mechanism for purposes of eliciting pharmaceutical 
R&D is not a question we can address here.  Suffice it to say that our current system of financing 
pharmaceutical innovation relies heavily on these rights.    There is no direct equivalent in the 
world of free software.  If a copyleft condition – however drafted and imposed – did attach to 
some of synthetic biology parts, care would have to be taken in the design of the system, lest the 
result was to make it impossible for that technology to be developed into a patented therapy.   
The BIOS licenses, which restrict the copyleft condition to improvements on the enabling 
technology, and do not constrain patenting on transgenic plant products, provide an interesting 
model.  But the distinction between enabling technology and product may be easier to make in a 
situation like that faced by BIOS, where the enabling technology in question has a relatively 
clear innovation trajectory, both in terms of improvement to the technology itself and in terms of 
production of end products.     
In the mean time, the decision, already implemented, of the MIT Registry to place its 
parts into the public domain certainly provides important protection against the threat of patents 
clogging innovation in the synthetic biology space.  Placing parts into the public domain not only 
makes the parts unpatentable, but it undermines the possibility of patents on trivial 
improvements.  In the end, a public domain strategy comparable to that employed by the public 
Human Genome Project may not be ideal, but it is certainly a good start. 
Table 1 
 
Strategy Advantages Disadvantages∗ 
Patents (20 years from time of 
patent application to exclude 
others from use of invention) 
Clear property right basis for 
copyleft license (license that 
requires improvements to be 
distributed freely) 
 Expensive (approx. $25,000 
per patent in U.S. for complex 
inventions) 
Copyright (attaches 
immediately upon creation; 
exclusive right to copy and 
improve that lasts for 70 years 
after author’s death, or if work 
of corporate authorship, 95 
years from publication) 
Clear property right basis for 
copyleft license; inexpensive 
Legal basis for assertion of 
copyright unclear – no explicit 
basis in the Copyright Act and 
some theoretical arguments 
against. 
Contract (terms vary) Inexpensive Copyleft license requires strict 
limits on information 
dissemination 
Sui generis (one of a kind) 
legislation (“Open” databases; 
“social patents”) 
Narrowly tailored to problem Legislative solutions are 
difficult and slow.   
 
*In all of the copyleft approaches, there are line-drawing issues.  One has to be very careful 
regarding precisely what material is covered by the requirement.    
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